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Recent Federal Circuit interpretations of patent infringement laws that control 
cross-border activities appear to be tangled and conflicting because they are 
not based upon any underlying doctrine.  In this note I attempt to unravel and 
synthesize current case law into a cogent set of principles.  I demonstrate that, 
although the case law delineates a coherent doctrine, this doctrine is by no 
means ideal or well-settled due primarily to the fact that method claims are 
included in the purvey of a statute not originally enacted to regulate such 
inventions.  This over breadth causes many tensions that require complex 
rules, such as the detailed doctrine necessary to properly determine 
component status of tangible products in relation to a process invention.  In 
some cases, these rules reinforce the underlying doctrine by correctly 
excluding certain situations from the creation of § 271(f) liability.  This is 
done, however, at the great cost of complexity and awkwardness.  These 
problems have not only increased the inherent tension in § 271(f) doctrine, but 
have also unsettled the Federal Circuit itself, resulting in the issuance of 
contentious dissenting opinions acknowledging the shortcomings of the 
current majority.  This paper shows that although it is possible to coherently 
synthesize current C.A.F.C. § 271(f) case law, the resulting rules leave the 
doctrine in a precarious position that will not stabilize as long as § 271(f) 
governs process inventions. 
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Today’s world economy allows for the practical and profitable cross-border development, 
manufacture and use of commercial products at a scale that is no longer dominated by purely 
domestic activities.  Wireless email services, like that of Blackberry, depend on a system spread 
over multiple countries with a subscriber base that has passed 5 million users who depend on its 
services for personal, business and governmental functions.2  Software giants distribute software 
by shipping golden-master discs to customers abroad with licenses to copy, helping to create 
single-company revenues approaching $40 billion and net incomes of over $12 billion.3  At this 
scale, cross-border activities no longer take a back seat in the control of national economic 
environments.  As such, nations’ intellectual property regimes must adapt and properly regulate 
these cross-border business models to effectively facilitate both business and intellectual 
development.   
This framework, like all ideal legal frameworks, must provide clear answers that can be 
understood by those the framework is intended to regulate.  Recent Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit (C.A.F.C.) interpretations of patent infringement laws that control cross-border 
activities, however, appear to be tangled and conflicting based upon the absence of an 
underlining doctrine.  The existing insufficient doctrine, like all court-created doctrines, was 
created in reaction to a series of independent cases.  As a result, the doctrine created does not 
have an obvious underlying coherency that can be easily understood.  An understanding of the 
law is essential to businesses and practitioners that are attempting to function beneath this 
framework. 
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At this time, secondary sources have only partially addressed this problem.  That is, they 
have either dealt only with the results of individual cases or narrow factual situations.  For 
example, several authors have written on the propriety of individual Federal Circuit decisions 
such as Eolas and RIM.  Further, others have focused on the effect of C.A.F.C. doctrine on 
specific industries such as software.  Still, other secondary sources simply do not address the 
latest C.A.F.C. decisions.  As such, secondary sources do not provide the needed presentation of 
the current doctrine as it generally applies, limited only by that which has been announced by the 
Federal Circuit.4  Through this note I attempt to unravel and synthesize current case law into a 
cogent set of principles that can be applied by both patent practitioners and businesses operating 
in environments heavily dependent on intellectual property.  
Part I begins by introducing the traditional patent protection, with a focus on the reach 
that territorial restrictions have on such protection.  Next, the disassembled-exportation loophole 
that results from these traditional territorial restrictions is discussed.  Part I then explores the 
judicial and legislative responses to that loophole.  That is, the Supreme Court case Deepsouth v. 
Laitram, which acknowledged the validity of the loophole, and Congress’s ultimate closing of 
the loophole with § 271(f) are explored. 
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 See Alan M. Fisch & Brent H. Allen, The Application of Domestic Patent Law to Exported Software: 35 U.S.C. § 
271(f), 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 557 (2004); Daniel P. Homiller,  From Deepsouth to the Great White North: The 
Extraterritorial Reach of United States Patent Law After Research In Motion, 2005 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 17 
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the Export of Software: Living in a Material World, 22 NO. 10 COMPUTER & INTERNET LAWYER 16 (October 2005); 
William R. Thornewell II, Patent Infringement Prevention and the Advancement of Technology: Application of 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f) to Software and "Virtual Components," 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2815 (2005); Steven C. Tietsworth, 
Exporting Software Components--Finding a Role for Software in 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) Extraterritorial Patent 
Infringement, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 405 (2005); Virginia Zaunbrecher, Eolas, AT&T, & Union Carbide: The New 
Extraterritoriality of U.S. Patent Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 33 (2006). 
 
  
Part II sequentially presents the interpretation of § 271(f) by the Federal Circuit, the 
highest court to interpret the new statute.  This section begins by analyzing early Federal Circuit 
interpretation, which occurred before the court began to directly address the two critical 
requirements of § 271(f): “supply” and “component statutes.”  Part II then introduces the modern 
case law that forms current § 271(f) doctrine.  This detailed analysis highlights the changing and 
disparate positions various benches of the Federal Circuit have on the interpretation of § 271(f). 
Part III critically analyzes, sorts and synthesizes this case law into a cogent set of 
principles that form the current rule.  Part III begins by sifting the common law limitations 
applicable to “component status” from other limitations that may be present.  These “component 
status” limitations are dealt with through an analysis of the distinctions the court relies upon, 
such as a possible product-process distinction and one based around tangibility.  Part III then 
conducts a similarly organized analysis of limitations applicable to the interpretation of the 
“supply” requirement of § 271(f).  Finally, Part III presents the rules that result from this 
complete case law synthesis.  These rules show that when determining whether something is a 
component, the analysis differs for product and process claims, while when determining whether 
there has been a “supply,” the analysis does not vary according to the type of invention at issue. 
Part IV applies these rules to various situations in order to flesh the doctrine out to 
facilitate a full understanding of the repercussions the case law of the Federal Circuit has caused.  
For example, Part IV first applies the current rules to activities that may infringe a patented 
product.  Part IV then applies the rules to activities that may infringe a patented method of 
making a product and a patented method of using a product.  Part IV concludes by exploring the 
current rule’s complex, and sometimes unwieldy, effect on traditional patent law doctrine and the 
loopholes that remain.  As such, through this note I demonstrate that although it may be possible 
  
to understand the current rule of law through coherent synthesis of § 271(f) case law, because of 
the Federal Circuit’s unnecessarily broad interpretation of § 271(f) that is not fully accepted, 
even within the C.A.F.C. itself, the current rule is by no means settled. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Traditional Patent Protection 
 
The patent system is the means Congress chose to “promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts” under the Constitution.5  This system confers upon an inventor a limited monopoly 
covering new,6 useful,7 non-obvious8 inventions by means of an issued patent.  Such a patent 
grants to that inventor the right to exclude others from various activities by defining those 
activities as patent infringement.9 
The most straightforward form of patent infringement is direct infringement.  Direct 
infringement is the unauthorized making, using, offering to sell or selling of the patented 
invention during the term of a patent.10  In addition to direct infringement, liability is also 
imposed upon those who indirectly infringe a patent through secondary infringement doctrines 
such as active inducement.11  In the context of secondary liability doctrines, a direct infringer is 
always required.12  Further, both direct and indirect infringement generally do not control 
                                                 
5
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
6
 See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000). 
7
 Id. § 101. 
8
 Id. § 103. 
9
 Id. § 271. 
10
 Id. § 271(a). 
11
 Id. § 271(b). 
12
 Direct infringement is a prerequisite to a finding of induced infringement.  See, e.g., Met-Coil Sys. Corp. v. 
Korners Unlimited, Inc., 803 F.2d 684, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
  
extrateritiorial behaviors, such as foreign copying.13  Thus, one who encourages such activities 
abroad is traditionally not liable as either a direct or indirect infringer. 
B. The Disassembled-Exportation Loop Hole 
 
With the ever increasing globalization of business, foreign and domestic activities begin 
to blend together creating a need to increase the reach of patents to include a number of activities 
that would not traditionally be considered infringement.  Without such a modification to the 
patent doctrine, the decreasing cost of conducting business across national boundaries has 
increased the ease of “gaming” the patent system.  For instance, a company conducting activities 
both inside and outside of the United States might adjust which activities are conducted 
domestically and which are conducted extraterritorially in order to avoid infringement.  As the 
ease of such adjustments increased, large loopholes in traditional patent scope began to form. 
Under traditional United States patent law, if a company produced a product patented by 
another under a United States patent, some of the company’s activities would be proscribed.  For 
example, if the company sold the product in the United States, such behavior would infringe the 
patent.14  Such infringement would not depend on where the product was initially produced.  On 
the other hand, if the company sold the product in foreign countries, those sales would not 
necessarily infringe the patent.  For instance, if the product was designed, produced and then sold 
entirely within Canada, U.S. patent law would not be implicated.  On the other hand, if the 
company produces the product within the United States while still selling it only in Canada, the 
domestic production would infringe the patent under § 271(a).15   
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 Direct infringement requires that the copying be executed domestically.  35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).  As such, 




 Production is a sufficient condition for direct infringement.  Id.   
  
Infringement under § 271(a) requires each element of a patented invention to be present 
in the infringing product.  Thus, in the domestic production with foreign sale example, if the 
company only produced part of the patented invention, there would be no infringement.  That is, 
if the patented product consisted of two combined components, part A combined with part B, 
infringement would require either the sale or production of a product consisting of precisely that: 
part A combined with part B.  Thus, the domestic production of only part A or only part B would 
not infringe the patent.  Further, the production of both components would not infringe so long as 
the combination consisting of part A and part B is not itself produced. 
A company may thus seek to produce both part A and part B and sell them in a kit that 
contains directions explaining how the end customer may combine part A with part B.  Here, the 
company is not itself manufacturing the patented product, but rather is actively inducing the 
customer to manufacture the patented product by including directions for executing the patented 
combination.  By actively inducing another to infringe, the company has now avoided liability 
under § 271(a).  Section 271(b), however, broadens the definition of infringement to include 
those who actively induce others to infringe a patent.   
The next step the company may take to distance itself from infringement would be to sell 
only the individual components, rather than a kit that included directions for combination.  This 
may be profitable if the company knows that there is no other real use for either part A or B other 
than in this combination.  As such, the directions for combination may therefore be unnecessary.  
In this case, the company is no longer actively inducing the combination and would therefore 
avoid liability under both § 271(a) and § 271(b).  Yet, the company has again failed to avoid 
  
liability.  Under § 271(c) the sale alone would constitute contributory infringement and the 
company would again be liable.16 
For the company in our example to be liable under both active inducement and 
contributory infringement theories, there must, however, be a final infringer.17  That is, if the 
final customer does not infringe the patent, there can be no active inducement or contributory 
infringement.  This creates a large loophole for those who sell the product abroad.  That is, a 
customer located outside of the United States who combines parts A and B to manufacture the 
patented invention does not infringe the patent because under § 271(a) such manufacture must be 
within the United States.  As such, the foreign sale of the kit, with or without the instructions, 
would not be an infringement and liability is completely avoided.  Our hypothetical company 
may take advantage of this gap in definition of patent infringement and profit from the domestic 
production and foreign sale, so long as it is in an uncombined component form of the patented 
invention. 
C. Deepsouth v. Laitram 
 
As is to be expected, suit was filed against a company for the domestic manufacture and 
foreign sale of the components of a patented invention, much as described in the hypothetical 
company of above.  In 1969, Deepsouth Packing Co. was accused of infringing Laitram Corp.’s 
patented shrimp-deveining machine.18  As the court noted,  
Deepsouth in all respects save final assembly of the parts 'makes' the invention. It [did] so 
with the intent of having the foreign user effect the combination without [the patent 
owner’s] permission. Deepsouth [sold] these components as though they were the 
machines themselves; the act of assembly [was] regarded, indeed advertised, as of no 
importance.19 
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 Id. § 271(c). 
17
 Met-Coil, 803 F.2d at 687. 
18
 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 519 (1972). 
19
 Id. at 524. 
  
 
Latiram argued that making a patented invention under § 271(a) should be construed to include 
“the substantial manufacture of the constituent parts of a machine”20 rather than basing 
construction of the statute “upon a hypertechnical reading of the patent code that, if tolerated, 
will deprive it of its right to the fruits of the inventive genius of its assignors.”21  In effect, 
Latiram considered the fact that the final machine was assembled abroad by the end user (rather 
than domestically) to be of no legal importance.  The court, however, was not convinced that 
such a distinction based upon whether the activity was foreign or domestic was irrelevant. 
The traditional “patent system makes no claim to extraterritorial effect.”22  As such, the 
court was hesitant to extend the reach of patent law to regulate activities in other countries.  In 
Deepsouth, although Laitram argued the case as one of strict statutory construction, the court 
decided that what was “at stake here [was] the right of American companies to compete with an 
American patent holder in foreign markets.”23  The court, therefore, refused to extend the 
territorial reach of U.S. patent law absent “a clear and certain signal from Congress.”24 
D. Enactment of Section § 271(f) 
 
The signal that the Deepsouth court required came 12 years later in the Patent Law 
Amendments of 1984.25  Although the legislative history of the amendment is sparse, the 
congressional record stated that the amendment was intended to prevent copiers from avoiding 
U.S. patents by supplying components of a patented product in this country so that the assembly 
of the components may be completed abroad. This proposal responds to the United States 
                                                 
20
 Id. at 528. 
21
 Id. at 524. 
22




 Deepsouth, 406 U.S. at 531 (“We would require a clear and certain signal from Congress before approving the 
position of a litigant who, as respondent here, argues that the beachhead of privilege is wider, and the area of public 
use narrower, than courts had previously thought.”). 
25
 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000). 
  
Supreme Court decision in Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp concerning the need for a 
legislative solution to close a loophole in patent law.26  
Amongst other amendments, to address this loophole the Act included the introduction of 
§ 271(f).  This new provision contained two subsections: § 271(f)(1)27 and § 271(f)(2).28  Each 
subsection contained two principle requirements of that which is supplied: “supply” and 
“component” status.  The specific language of these subjections is similar to other “statutory 
infringement provisions for induced and contributory infringement, but, unlike these provisions, 
neither requires a direct infringement to impose liability.” Thus, § 271(f) closed the 
disassembled-exportation loophole.29  
Section 271(f)(1) controls situations, such as that of Deepsouth, by imposing liability on 
someone who supplies from the United States uncombined components of a patented invention.  
This supply must actively induce a combination of the components outside of the United States 
in a manner that would infringe the patent if the combination occurred within the United States.  
Further, all or substantially all of the components must be supplied under § 271(f)(1). 
Section 271(f)(2), on the other hand, creates liability for those who supply any 
component (rather than all or substantially all of the components) of a patented invention that is 
especially adapted for use in the patented invention and does not have substantial non-infringing 
uses.  This section, however, requires knowledge.  The potential infringer must know that such 
                                                 
26
 Tietsworth, supra note 3, at 427. 
27
 35 U.S.C. § 271(f)(1) (2000) (“Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United 
States all or a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, where such components are 
uncombined in whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside 
of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within the United 
States, shall be liable as an infringer.”). 
28
 35 U.S.C.§ 271(f)(2) (“Whoever without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the United States 
any component of a patented invention that is especially made or especially adapted for use in the invention and not 
a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, where such component is 
uncombined in whole or in part, knowing that such component is so made or adapted and intending that such 
component will be combined outside of the United States in a manner that would infringe the patent if such 
combination occurred within the United States, shall be liable as an infringer.”). 
29
 Tietsworth, supra note 3, at 427. 
  
component is made and intended for the component to be combined outside the United States in 
a manner that would infringe the patent if the combination occurred within the United States. 
II. APPELLATE INTERPRETATION 
 
As both provisions contain two significant limitations, “supply” and “component” status, 
common law is needed to flesh out the metes and bounds of § 271(f) infringement.  Although § 
271(f) has been in place for over 20 years, the United States Supreme Court has yet to decide a 
case constructing it.  As such, current C.A.F.C. doctrine controls as the highest level of authority 
on the section. 
A. Early Federal Circuit Interpretation 
 
C.A.F.C. case law begins with Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp. where the 
C.A.F.C. first addressed § 271(f).30  In Rotec, the defendant offered to supply components of a 
patented invention, but did not in fact supply the components.31  Based on a straight forward 
interpretation of the provision, the court held that “§ 271(f)(2) imposes liability only on those 
who ‘supply’ or ‘cause to supply’ any component of a patented invention” rather than simply “on 
those who ‘offer to supply’ any component of a patented invention.”32   
Following Rotec, the court further fleshed out § 271(f) in Waymark Corp. v. Porta 
Systems Corp.33  There, the defendant argued that liability should not be found because there was 
no evidence of actual assembly.  This is similar to an argument that may be raised to defend 
against a charge of secondary liability where a direct infringer is required.  Section 271(f), on the 
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 Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 215 F.3d 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
31




 See Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
  
other hand, requires no such direct infringer.  As such, Waymark held that “[t]he statute does not 
require actual assembly,” only the supply of components.34 
Following Waymark, the C.A.F.C. heard Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc.35  In 
Southwest Software, the alleged infringer argued that § 271(f) should be constructed such that a 
“component” cannot be a part of a method claim, and as such, method claims could not be 
infringed under § 271(f).36  Rather than address such a construction due to a technicality,37 the 
C.A.F.C. never reached the merits of the argument.  In fact, such a question would not be 
answered conclusively for several years. 
B. Recent Federal Circuit Interpretation 
 
1. Standard Havens v. Gencor 
 
Standard Havens Products, Inc. v. Gencor Industries, Inc. was the first time the C.A.F.C. 
directly confronted construction of the principle requirements of “supply” and “component” 
status found in § 271(f).38  Here, the patent in suit was directed to a method of producing asphalt 
compositions.39  Standard Havens argued that Gencor contributorily infringed its patent through 
ten sales of asphalt production facilities, one of the sales being to a foreign customer located in 
England.40  Regarding that sale, there was no evidence of the plant’s use in the United States.41  
With no evidence of a direct infringer, there could be no indirect infringement under §§ 271(b) 
                                                 
34
 Id. at 1368. 
35
 Southwest Software, Inc. v. Harlequin Inc., 226 F.3d 1280 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
36
 Id. at 1290. 
37
 Id. (“Harlequin's and ECRM's argument concerning the application of § 271 to method claims was raised for the 
first time on appeal; for that reason, we will not consider it.”). 
38
 Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
39
 Id. at 1363. 
40




or (c).42  Standard Havens, however, argued that this sale violated § 271(f).  In response, Gencor 
argued that “the sale of a product to be used in a patented process outside the United States is not 
within this provision.”43  Agreeing with Gencor, the C.A.F.C. “[did] not find the provisions of 35 
U.S.C. § 271(f) implicated” by the sale in the United States of an unclaimed apparatus.44 
2. Bayer v. Housey 
 
For more than a decade, the C.A.F.C. did not again address interpretation of the supply 
and component requirements.  In 2003, the C.A.F.C. was called on to interpret § 271(g) and in 
doing so, looked to § 271(f).45  Housey argued that Bayer infringed its patent regarding its 
method of screening substances in order to identify and characterize drugs.46  Practicing the 
method of this patent would yield information regarding the effectiveness of specific substances 
for the treatment of diseases.47  Housey alleged that Bayer practiced this method abroad, 
resulting in information regarding the identification of a particular drug being made available to 
those interested.48   This information was then used within the United States by Bayer to develop 
a pharmaceutical product. 
Section 271(g) prohibits importing into the United States a “product which is made by a 
process patented in the Untied States.”49  Housey argued that when Bayer domestically used the 
information gained abroad through the execution of the patented method, Bayer imported a 
                                                 
42
 Id. (“[B]ecause a contributorily infringing counterflow plant was not actually sold in those three instances, there 
was no direct infringement of the ‘938 patent . . . .”). 
43
 Brief of Appellant at 19, Standard Havens (No. 90-1048). 
44
 Standard Havens, 953 F.2d at 1374. 
45
 Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., Inc., 340 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
46




 Id. (“Housey requested the defendants to identify the methods used in its facilities but the [sic] Bayer failed to do 
so” leading to a presumption of use.). 
49
 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2000). 
  
product made by a patented process and thus infringed its patent under § 271(g).50  That is, the 
information was a component of the patented method.  Bayer, on the other hand, argued that § 
271(g) applies only to methods of manufacture rather than a method that yields information.51 
Addressing these arguments, the C.A.F.C. was called on to interpret the meaning of a 
“product of a patented invention” under § 271(g); specifically, whether § 271(g) addressed only 
physical articles of manufacture or both physical products and intangible processes.  Examining 
the text of the statute, the court noted that the “second exception to § 271(g), which provides that 
there is no infringement where the accused product ‘becomes a trivial and nonessential 
component of another product,’ also appears to contemplate a physical product.”52  The court 
also examined the legislative history of § 271(g).  As part of an earlier bill, along with the 
precursor to § 271(g), the provision that later became § 271(f) was proposed.  The C.A.F.C. 
found that § 271(f) also applied only to physical manufacture and that “together the two new 
statutory acts of infringement were intended to avoid encouraging manufacturing outside the 
United States” rather than a method that yielded only information.53  It is worth noting that this 
interpretation of § 271(f) was used only as a tool to assist in the interpretation of its sister 
section, § 271(g), and not binding precedent as to § 271(f) interpretation. 
3. Pellegrini v. Analog Devices 
 
Less than a year after Bayer, the C.A.F.C. decided Pellegrini.54  Pellegrini was the sole 
inventor and owner of a patent directed to a brushless motor drive circuit.55  Analog, an 
integrated circuit designer and manufacturer, produced a line of integrated circuit chips that, in 
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combination with other support circuitry, allegedly infringed upon Pellegrini's drive circuit 
patent.56  The development of the infringing drive circuit was conducted entirely within the 
United States.57  After development, the final design and instructions for manufacture were 
transmitted abroad where the chips were subsequently manufactured.58 
 Pellegrini argued that the design and instructions for manufacture were a component of a 
patented invention and that their transmission constituted a supply from the United States, and 
thus, Analog infringed upon its patent under § 271(f).59  Analog, on the other hand, argued that 
"§ 271(f) is simply inapplicable to products manufactured outside the United States and never 
shipped to or from the United States.”60  Holding in Analog’s favor, the C.A.F.C. agreed that "§ 
271(f) clearly refers to physical supply of components, not simply to the supply of instruction or 
corporate oversight.”61  Although the court held that there was “no physical supply of 
components,” it did not make clear whether this was the result because only information was 
transmitted and there was thus no supply, or because the instructions and corporate oversight 
were not a component of the drive circuit patent.  
4. Eolas v. Microsoft 
 
After this series of narrow interpretations of § 271(f) in the year following Bayer, the 
C.A.F.C. decided Eolas,62 signaling a turning point in § 271(f) interpretation.  Eolas was the 
owner of a patent, the ‘906 patent, involving both a method and device that allowed "a user to 
use a web browser in a fully interactive environment.”63  Eolas alleged that Microsoft's Internet 
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Explorer infringed upon Claims 1 and 6 of the patent.64  Claim 1 of the '906 patent was a method 
claim that recited, inter alia, "a method for running an application program in a computer 
network environment”65 while Claim 6 was a product claim that recites, inter alia, "a computer 
usable medium having computer readable program code physically embodied therein.”66   The 
C.A.F.C. analyzed whether Microsoft's exportation infringed upon Claim 6 under § 271(f) and as 
such, needed to "decide whether software code made in the United States and exported abroad is 
a 'component[ ] of a patented invention' under section 271(f)(1).”67 
In its analysis, the court, rather than limiting the section’s application to only product 
claims or only method claims, determined that "every form of invention eligible for patenting 
falls within the protection of section 271(f)."68  The court then went on to construe the meaning 
of "component," stating that “a ‘component’ of a process invention… encompass[es] method 
steps or acts (citation omitted). A ‘component’ of an article of manufacture invention… 
encompass[es] a part of that construct.”69  The court then applied this definition to the facts of 
the case and concluded that “the ‘computer readable program code’ claimed in Claim 6 of the 
'906 patent is a part or component of that patented invention.”70 
Although the court offered a general definition of what constituted a component, it 
immediately carved an exception.  As the court explained, generally speaking, method steps or 
acts are the components of a process claim.  However, in situations where the differences 
between a process claim and a product claim are not well defined, what would be a component of 
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one claim might also be a component of another.71  For example, in this case the invention at 
issue was computer software claimed as both a product and a process.   
[A]s the district court pointed out, process and product--software and hardware--
are practically interchangeable in the field of computer technology (citation 
omitted). On a functioning computer, software morphs into hardware and vice 
versa at the touch of a button . . . . Thus, sound policy again counsels against 
varying the definition of “component of a patented invention” according to the 
particular form of the part under consideration, particularly when those parts 
change form during operation of the invention as occurs with software code.”72   
 
As a result, the court expressly held that components of a patented invention, claimed as either a 
product or process, could be non-physical parts of the invention such as software. 
Through this holding, the court clarified that Pellegrini addressed the meaning of 
"supply" rather than of "component.”73  Although the court expressly stated that the Pellegrini 
decision did not depend upon the fact that the instructions and oversight were not tangible, Eolas 
offered no guidance as to the proper basis for the Pellegrini holding of non-infringement.  
 
5. AT&T v. Microsoft 
 
Four months after Eolas, the C.A.F.C. decided another case in which Microsoft was a 
defendant.74  Here, again, Microsoft allegedly infringed upon another's patent (in this case 
AT&T's patent) under § 271(f) by shipping a golden-master disc75 abroad with the intent that it 
be replicated.76  AT&T not only argued that Microsoft was liable for damages for the exportation 
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of the golden master disc, but also that Microsoft was liable for the copies made abroad.77  In this 
case, the court relied on Eolas to determine that the software was a component of an invention.78   
Next, the court analyzed whether the term "supply" in § 271(f) may be deemed to include 
"software replicated abroad from a master version exported from the United States-with the 
intent that it be replicated.”79  The court answered this question affirmatively by pegging the 
construction of "supply" to the manner in which such components are typically supplied.80  
Finding that due to  
the nature of the technology, the 'supplying’ of software commonly involves 
generating a copy….  Accordingly, for software 'components,' the acts of copying 
is subsumed in the act of 'supplying,' such that sending a single copy abroad with 
the intent that it be replicated invokes § 271(f) liability for those foreign-made 
copies.81 
 
As these foreign-made copies did not originate in the United States, Microsoft argued that 
under Pellegrini such copies were not physically supplied from the United States.82  In response, 
the C.A.F.C. stated that Pellegrini construed the word "component" rather than the word 
"supply.”83  That is, in response to Microsoft's argument, the C.A.F.C. stated that "Pellegrini 
held that liability under § 271(f) may exist only where a component itself—as opposed to 
instructions for manufacturing the component or management oversight—has been supplied.”84  
Through this interpretation, the C.A.F.C. re-interpreted Pellegrini to draw a distinction based 
upon the definition of "component" that did not include instructions and oversight, rather than a 
distinction based upon a construction of the word "supply." 
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This expansive view of the term supply was not shared by all members of the court.  In a 
dissenting opinion, Judge Rader expressed his apprehension for increasing the extraterritorial 
effects of United States patent law by finding liability for copies made wholly abroad.  Such an 
expansion, as Judge Rader explained, is in conflict with Pellegrini which "holds that there can be 
no liability under § 271(f) unless components are shipped from the United States for 
assembly.”85 
6. NTP v. RIM 
 
Also, before the Federal Circuit was NTP v. RIM.86  NTP was the owner of a patent 
directed towards an email system that provided wireless email delivery features.  RIM, a 
Canadian Corporation with its principle place of business in Canada,87 sold the allegedly 
infringing BlackBerry wireless email system.  The BlackBerry system functioned through the 
use of three primary components: (1) a BlackBerry handheld unit which displayed emails to a 
user, (2) an email relay that was used to route emails to the BlackBerry handheld unit, and (3) a 
wireless network that coupled the relay to the BlackBerry handheld unit.88  RIM built such a 
wireless network and relay in Canada89 and sold handheld units within the United States to be 
used in Canada by customers.90  NTP asserted that such behavior constituted infringement under 
§ 271(a) .91  Furthermore, NTP argued that if even if subsection (a) was not applicable, patent 
infringement had nevertheless occurred under subsections (f) or (g).92  
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In a first, and later withdrawn, opinion the C.A.F.C. examined potential liability under § 
271(a).  RIM argued that “an action for infringement under section 271(a) may lie only if all 
allegedly infringing activity occurs within the United States.”93  In this case, because the relay 
was located in Canada, RIM argued that standard was not met.94  Relying on the “control and 
beneficial use standard,” the C.A.F.C. originally held that because “all of the other components 
of RIM’s system are located in the United States, and the control and beneficial use of RIM’s 
system occured in the United States,” the RIM system infringed upon NTP’s system under § 
271(a).95  Finding liability under § 271(a), the court never considered arguments raised under 
other provisions of § 271. 
Following this opinion, RIM filed motions for rehearing and rehearing en Banc.  
Although denying the motion for rehearing en Banc, “the original three-member panel (Judges 
Michel, Schall, and Linn) granted the petition for rehearing and revised portions of the opinion 
that discussed Section 271 — and thus withdrawing the December 14 opinion.”96  
In the second opinion, the court narrowed the control and beneficial use test of § 271(a).  
In this opinion, the court held that “a process cannot be used ‘within’ the United States as 
required by section 271(a) unless each of the steps is performed within this country”97 while a 
system claim must only meet the control and beneficial use test.98  Since the asserted claims were 
method claims, in which no liability could be found under § 271(a), the C.A.F.C. was able to 
reach arguments made under § 271(f). 
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NTP argued that RIM’s domestic sale of handheld units, which were brought into Canada 
by end users for use on RIM’s Canadian network, constituted a supply of a component of a 
patented invention.99  In evaluating the method claims at issue, the C.A.F.C. first differentiated, 
and then narrowed, the recent Eolas decision.  The court first noted that the Eolas decision found 
liability based on infringement of Claim 6, the product claim, stating that “Eolas held that 
software code—even if intangible—is a component of a patented product within the meaning of 
§ 271(f).”100  The court went on to state that “the holding does not impact the application of § 
271(f) to the method claims of the present appeal.”101  The court, as such, narrowed the 
application of Eolas to product, rather than process, claims.  The court found that in general: 
[I]t is difficult to conceive of how one might supply or cause to be supplied all or 
a substantial portion of the steps of a patented method…it is clear that RIM's 
supply of the BlackBerry handheld devices and Redirector products to its 
customers in the United States is not the statutory ‘supply’ of any ‘component’ 
steps for combination into NTP's patented methods.102   
To support this statement, the court relied upon Standard Havens and Joy Tech, stating 
that both cases held the sale of a product to perform a process did not infringe the 
process.103 
7. Union Carbide v. Shell 
 
At the time of this writing, the most recent interpretation of § 271(f) by the C.A.F.C. 
271(f) is Union Carbide v. Shell.104  Like RIM, the plaintiff in this case, Union Carbide, alleged 
its method patent was infringed under § 271(f).  Union Carbide was the assignee of a patent 
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directed to a process for producing ethylene oxide (EO).105  The production of EO required the 
use of a catalyst to increase the efficiency of production.  The Union Carbide patent teaches a 
process of EO production using an improved silver catalyst to increase reaction efficiency.  Here, 
Shell produced an equivalent silver catalyst.106  In addition to Shell’s domestic use of the 
catalysts, Shell exported the catalyst to be used abroad in the production of EO gas.107  Union 
Carbide argued that this exportation infringed their process patent under § 271(f).108 
The C.A.F.C. was asked to determine whether the phrase “any component of a patented 
invention” of § 271(f) included components used in the performance of patented processes.  In 
making this determination, the court again looked to Eolas.  Although RIM expressly interpreted 
Eolas to apply only to product claims, here, the C.A.F.C. stated that Eolas featured the 
exportation of a component used in the performance of a patented process.109  That is, the 
software on the disc was a component used in the performance of a patented method.  The court 
then equated the situation presented in Union Carbide to Eolas in order to determine that the 
catalyst was a component used in the performance of a patented method.110 
As in RIM, following the rendering of this opinion, a petition for rehearing and rehearing 
en Banc was promptly filed.111  Although the petition was denied, a dissent was filed by Judge 
Lourie (with whom Judge Michel, the Chief Judge, and Judge Linn joined112) that sheds light on 
the contentious nature of the grounds upon which Union Carbide stands.   Through this dissent, 
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several key points of the Union Carbide analysis were disputed.  The dissent disagreed with any 
application of § 271(f) to method claims, stating that the “whole tenor of that provision relates to 
physical inventions, i.e., apparatus or compositions, not methods.”113  This position was 
supported by an interpretation of prior case law alternative to that of the majority.  The dissent 
interpreted Eolas and AT&T to apply only to apparatuses and systems, not to methods - as held 
by the majority.114   
The dissent further interpreted RIM’s finding of an absence of infringement to depend 
upon a lack of component status, rather than upon a lack of supply.115  That is, rather than 
interpreting Standard Havens to depend upon niceties, such as the nature of the machine 
exported,116 it was interpreted to simply hold that the provisions of § 271(f) were not implicated 
in a situation where an apparatus for use in a patented process was sent abroad.  Thus, as this 
dissent exemplifies, although it may be possible to understand the current rule of law through the 
coherent synthesis of § 271(f) case law, the current rule is by no means well-settled. 
III. CASE LAW SYNTHESIS 
 
Although the current law is by no means settled, before an analysis into the current 
Federal Circuit doctrine’s propriety is attempted, one must first understand that doctrines 
implications.  A synthesis of C.A.F.C. case law can be used to tease out the resulting rules that 
are being expressed—those rules that are both natural and logical, and other rules that are more 
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convoluted and may be less intended.  In order to better understand the varying outcomes of 
these decisions, it is helpful to separate this analysis into the component and supply requirements 
of § 271(f).  The two separate requirements may be used as a natural division for this analysis.  
That is, it is helpful to separate the analysis of the first requirement, that of being “a component 
of a patented invention” from the second requirement, that of being “supplied...from the United 
States.”  Since these are separate and distinct requirements, close attention must be paid to 
determine which the C.A.F.C. is proscribing in each of its various holdings. 
A. Interpretation of Component 
 
Looking first to the construction of the phrase “component of a patented invention,” there 
are several possible distinctions that § 271(f) case law may have used to determine whether 
something is properly a component.  A first distinction that may have been relied upon is a 
product-process distinction.  This involves examining the type of invention, whether product or 
process, to assist in determining whether something is a component of a patented invention.  
Another possible distinction that the court may have relied upon is a distraction drawn between 
tangible and intangible aspects of an invention.  Further still, the C.A.F.C. may have considered 
whether the possible component is incorporated into the final product.  A detailed look at the 
history of § 271(f) case law is needed to determine the propriety and usefulness of these possible 
distinctions. 
1. Product-Process Distinction 
 
The product-process distinction has lingered in the background throughout nearly all of 
the Federal Circuit’s § 271(f) cases law.  For example, in Standard Havens the court stated that 
the sale of a product to be used in a patented process did not implicate the provisions of § 
  
271(f),117 thus suggesting that process claims did not have components. The C.A.F.C. directly 
addressed the product-process distinction in Eolas where the court expressly stated that “every 
form of invention deserves the protection of section 271(f).”118  Therefore, Eolas conclusively 
stated that the product-process distinction was not dispositive in deciding whether an invention 
could have components. 
The product-process distinction, although no longer directly dispositive as to whether an 
invention is capable of possessing components after Eolas, may still be used to indirectly arrive 
at the same result that limits the application of § 271(f) to only one invention type.  The 
definition of “component” may vary with the form of the invention.  For example, one may argue 
that a “component” of a process must encompass method steps or acts while a “component” of 
“an article of manufacture invention” must encompass a part of that construct.  In fact, such a 
definition of component was expressed by the C.A.F.C. in both Eolas119 and RIM.120  As it is 
difficult to conceive a way to supply a method step,121 if a method step is all that may be a 
component of a patented method, under this framework, patented methods would receive no 
protection under § 271(f).  As such, the product-process distinction may be used to define 
components of patented products that are supplyable, while defining components of a patented 
process that are not supplyable.  As a result, this creates the functional equivalent of a product-
process distinction that limits the application of § 271(f) to only product inventions.   
While Eolas clearly stated that sound policy counsels against such a variable 
definition,122 later cases muddied the waters.  For example, RIM narrowed Eolas’s application to 
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device claims only, stating that because “[the claim [of Eolas] was directed to a software 
product…the holding does not impact the application of section 271(f) to the method claims in 
the present appeal.”123  This interpretation relies on the fact that Eolas’s finding of infringement 
might have relied upon infringement of either a product or process claim.  Under this narrow 
interpretation, Eolas gives no binding construction of components of patented methods.  This 
positioned the RIM court to freely construe the meaning of “component” of a patented method. 
Unlike Eolas, for which it was possible to interpret the holding to be non-binding upon 
method claims, the facts of RIM required a holding to apply to method claims, thus positioning 
the C.A.F.C. to concretely construe § 271(f)’s application to method claims.  NTP argued that 
RIM’s sale of pager units to customers who later brought the pager units abroad infringed upon 
their patented method under § 271(f).124  The C.A.F.C. held “that RIM's supply of the 
BlackBerry handheld devices and Redirector products to its customers in the United States is not 
the statutory ‘supply’ of any ‘component’ steps for combination into NTP's patented 
methods.”125  Although, unlike Eolas, this holding applies to method claims rather than product 
claims, it brings with it an additional ambiguity.  The holding here does not necessarily proscribe 
components of a patented invention but may also proscribe their supply.  It is therefore difficult 
to determine whether the verdict of non-infringement was dependent upon the handheld unit not 
being a component of the patented method, or dependent upon the handheld unit simply not 
being supplied. 
In order to determine which term the RIM opinion construes, an examination of the 
citations given for the holding is useful.  The court relies on citations to Standard Havens and 
Joy Tech, both of which relate to the definition of “component.”  Standard Havens, for example, 
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was the first case to imply that a product-process distinction is dispositive with regard to 
component status.126  Further, the summary of the principle each case stands for, in both cases 
defines “component” and make no mention of “supply.”127  RIM therefore likely held that the 
handheld units were not components of a patented invention.  But, as the facts and the opinion of 
the case were both ambiguous, later case law must be examined to conclusively determine which 
term RIM in fact construed. 
This ambiguity was immediately clarified in the C.A.F.C.'s next § 271(f) case, Union 
Carbide.  Union Carbide interpreted the holding of RIM to rely on a construction of the term 
“supply”, rather than “component”, stating that “[u]nder the facts of NTP, this court declined to 
apply § 271(f) when RIM itself did not supply any component to a foreign affiliate” which “is 
different from [that] case because Shell supplies catalysts from the United States directly to 
foreign customers.”128  In addition to clarifying the facts relevant to the holding of RIM, the 
C.A.F.C. re-broadened the scope of Eolas to again apply to both method and process inventions, 
reaffirming that “the statute makes no distinction between patentable method/process inventions 
and other forms of patentable inventions.”129  Although this seems to be simply a restatement of 
the rule of law enunciated in Eolas, the facts of Union Carbide solidified the statement in a way 
the facts of Eolas could not.  Now resting on solid ground, current C.A.F.C. case law expresses 
that both process claims and method claims are covered by the provisions of § 271(f), thereby 
eliminating the product-process distinction. 
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2. Other Distinctions 
 
Although the product-process distinction is not fully dispositive of the component status 
of a part of an invention, it is still useful as a tool of analysis because of the many inherent 
differences between the two invention types.  That is, the usefulness of other possible 
distinctions may vary based upon whether an invention is a product or a process.  This section of 
the paper separately addresses product and process claims, pointing out the similarities and 
distinctions as they arise.   
a. Products 
 i. Tangibility 
When analyzing whether an element is a “component” of a product invention there has 
often been argued a distinction based upon tangibility.130  The appropriateness of relying on this 
distinction to determine whether something may be a “component” was unclear throughout early 
case law, beginning with Bayer.  In Bayer, the court considered whether something was a 
“component” under § 271(g).131  Although not a decision directly involving § 271(f), because § 
271(g) also used similar “component” language, the court looked to the use of the term 
“component” in § 271(f) to assist in interpreting § 271(g).132  “In dicta, the Federal Circuit stated 
that the term "component" in section 271(g) appears to contemplate a physical product.” 133  As 
such, after Bayer, there appeared to be a general tangibility requirement for the components of a 
patented invention in § 271(f). 
After Bayer, Pellegrini again dealt with a possible tangibility requirement.  In holding 
that general instructions, oversight and management were not components because “§ 271(f)(1) 
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clearly refers to physical supply of components, not simply to the supply of instructions or 
corporate oversight,” the court seemed to reinforce the physicality requirement first suggested in 
Bayer.134  The later interpretation of Pellegrini, however, caused much confusion as the court 
struggled to determine whether the Pellegrini physicality requirement attached to the term 
“component” or “supply.”  A reading of Pellegrini alone does not reveal precisely where this 
physicality requirement attaches.   
The C.A.F.C.’s first interpretation of Pellegrini came in Eolas where the court stated that 
Pellegrini "did not address the meaning of the 'components' language in section 271(f).”135  As 
such, "Pellegrini requires only that components are physically supplied from the United States. 
Pellegrini does not impose on section 271(f) a tangibility requirement that does not appear 
anywhere in the language of that section.”136  Interpreting Pellegrini and § 271(f) not to attach a 
tangibility requirement to components of an invention was later affirmed in Union Carbide, thus 
making clear there is no tangibility requirement in “component” under § 271(f).137   
 ii. Incorporation 
Although, when interpreting Pellegrini in Eolas the C.A.F.C expressly disavowed a 
possible tangibility requirement imposed on “components” of a patented invention, the Eolas 
court was less clear as to whether Pellegrini announced a requirement involving “supply”; and if 
not, on what alternative grounds then did the Pellegrini decision rest?  One possible distinction 
the C.A.F.C. may be relying upon in determining whether an element is a component of a 
product is the incorporation of that element into the final product.   
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Though not directly expounded in Pellegrini, a logical analysis of the facts of the case, as 
well as later case law, reveals that incorporation may have been relied upon.  Beginning first 
with an examination of the plain text of the opinion reveals little. Although Pellegrini expressly 
held that instructions and management were not a “supplied component”,138 no specific 
distinctions were announced.  At first blush, it does not appear that this holding rested on a lack 
of tangibility of instructions and management; but as discussed above,139 later case law dictates 
that Pellegrini did not rely on a tangibility distinction.   
A second possible distinction upon which the holding of Pellegrini may rest, is the 
distinction drawn between physical and non-physical forms of “supplying.”  As explained 
below,140 later C.A.F.C. opinions express that this is not a proper distinction either.  Another 
distinction, one neither currently foreclosed by logic nor stare decisis, is the whether instructions 
and management, as the alleged components, are incorporated into the claimed product.  A lack 
of other factual distinctions further evidence that this may be the proper interpretation of 
Pellegrini. 
The propriety of this interpretation is buttressed by Eolas.  In determining whether 
computer code was a component of a patented invention, Eolas relied upon an incorporation 
distinction by looking to the fact that the computer code was “incorporated as an operating 
element of the ultimate device.”141  In fact, the court went on to state that “this operating element 
in effect drives the functional nucleus of the finished computer product,”142 suggesting that for 
an element to qualify as a “component” of a patented product it must not only be incorporated 
into the ultimate device, but it must also be incorporated in a non-trivial way.  Although a 
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requirement for a threshold level of importance that an incorporated component must have in the 
claimed product is not clear, Pellegrini and Eolas together demonstrate that there is an 
incorporation requirement for components of a product claim.  As a result, elements such as 
instructions and management that are not incorporated into a final product are not elements of 
the patented product.143 
b. Processes 
In addition to examining possible distinctions the C.A.F.C. may use to determine the 
metes and bounds of product claims, a similar analysis is also relevant to method claims.  This 
analysis should be conducted separately from that of product claims because distinctions that 
may not have been relevant to the proscription of components of product claims may in fact be 
relevant for the proscription of components of method claims.   
i. Tangibility 
In some cases, however, commonalities are present between the process and product 
doctrines.  For example, the C.A.F.C. rulings regarding the relevance of a tangibility distinction 
of method claims have followed closely to rulings of product claims. The first case to consider 
the language "component of a patented method" construed it to include only intangible elements, 
stating that "a 'component' of a process invention would encompass method steps or acts," while 
"a 'component' of an article of manufacture invention would encompass a part of that 
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construct.”144  Steps and acts are both abstract processes rather than tangible products, suggesting 
that tangibility is a relevant distinction.   
Later cases construed “component” to include additional tangible elements.  Although 
even later cases, including RIM, attempted to rein-in the definition of “component” to include 
only method steps or acts,145 Union Carbide recently reaffirmed Eolas.  In doing so, Union 
Carbide stated that intangible computer software was in fact a component of the patented 
method.146  This affirmation, however, was granted in a case where the alleged components at 
issue were tangible.  Accordingly, there may be freedom left for courts to modify this holding by 
refusing to follow Union Carbide’s non-binding dicta.  Until such time, Union Carbide remains 
strong authority explaining that there is no tangibility requirement to components of method 
claims. 
 
ii. Method: Method-Step Distinction 
While it is commonly accepted that components of method inventions may include 
intangible method steps or acts, it is less clear whether components of method claims could 
contain tangible components.  That is, whether a component of a process invention must be a 
method step.  Such determination depends in part on whether the examples in Eolas were 
intended as an exhaustive list.147  In Eolas, the court implied that the list was meant to be merely 
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illustrative, explaining that it “cannot construct a principled reason for treating process 
inventions different than structural products."148 This suggests that components of an invention 
claimed as a product would be also be components of the same invention when claimed as a 
process, "particularly when those parts change form during operation of the invention as occurs 
with software code," and that neither invention type should differentiate based on tangibility.149  
Although such a broad sweeping definition may not be proper,150 it suggests that the court did 
not intend for the list of possible components of a process invention to be exhaustive. 
The next case to construe the meaning of "component" and interpret Eolas was RIM.  
RIM strongly favored a narrow interpretation of Eolas, explaining that "[a] method, by its very 
nature, is nothing more than the steps of which it is comprised.  The invention recited in a 
method claim is the performance of the recited steps.”151  As discussed above,152 however, RIM 
did not necessarily turn on an interpretation of “component” and this portion of the opinion may 
be interpreted as dicta. 
Neither Eolas nor RIM clearly established whether components of method claims could 
contain tangible components..  The answer to this question was finally made clear in Union 
Carbide.  There, the court explicitly held that a physical element used in the execution of the 
claimed method, rather than simply a method step, is a component of the invention.153  As the 
holding of this case required this interpretation of "component," this portion of Union Carbide is 
binding authority. 
iii. The Union Carbide Definition 
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In addition to conclusively choosing a broad interpretation of "component" through its 
ultimate holding, Union Carbide affirmatively provided a definition of a “component of a 
patented method” stating that: 
 
both this case and Eolas feature the exportation of a component (i.e., a computer 
disc with program code in Eolas and a catalyst in this case) used in the 
performance of a patented process or method (i.e., the method steps executed by 
the computer in response to the computer readable program code in Eolas and the 
commercial production of EO in this case). In that setting, Eolas applied § 271(f) 
to Microsoft's exported component.  Similarly, § 271(f) applies to Shell's 
exportation of catalysts (i.e., a "component") used in the commercial production 
of EO abroad (i.e., a "patented invention").154 
 
Thus, under Union Carbide a "component" of a patented method includes not only method steps 
or acts, but also any “component used in the execution of the patented method.”155  This 
definition, however, contains two limitations dictated by both logic and precedent. 
The express language of this definition provides that the definition applies only to 
method claims.  For example, an application of this definition to the product at issue in Pellegrini 
would be in direct conflict with the holding.  This becomes clear if one attempts to compare the 
product claim holdings of Pellegrini with the process claim holdings of Eolas.  Pellegrini held 
that the instructions for the manufacture of a patented device were not a component of a patented 
invention,156 while Eolas held that the instructions for the execution of a patented method were a 
component.157  An application of the rule of Eolas to the facts of Pellegrini would require such 
instructions to be considered a "component" of the invention.  In addition, an application of this 
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definition to product claims would violate the aforementioned incorporation requirement158 of 
product claims.  As such, the rule described in Union Carbide is directly bound by precedent to 
apply only to method claims.   
A second limitation of the Union Carbide definition is that the term "component" only 
includes components used in the performance of the patented method, rather than entire devices.  
That is, a "component" is not an entire device that completely and entirely executes a patented 
method.  Such a limitation is required by Standard Havens, which held that a machine that 
executed a patented method was not a component.159  A textual hook for such a limitation is in 
the definition of the word "component."  American Heritage defines "component" as "[a] 
constituent element, as of a system" in contrast to the actual system in itself.160  Thus, Congress’ 
choice of the word “component” suggests an intended distinction between a component and an 
entire device. 
 
1. Constituent Element v. Complete System 
In order to understand the metes and bounds of this limitation, one must first understand 
what constitutes an “entire system” that is needed to practice a patented method.  The entire 
system may be thought of as being comprised of two constituents.  First, a physical device to 
enable the execution of the method is necessary.  Second, information to instruct the device to 
execute the specific method is needed.  These two constituents may be present as a single, 
assembled system, or instead, may be present as separate components. 
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One may consider the various classes of integrated circuits (IC) that are produced as an 
analogue to the “entire system” concept.  One class of ICs available are CPUs.  A CPU is a 
general purpose IC that may be programmed to execute any number of different programs, such 
as the CPU of a personal computer that can execute any software loaded onto the personal 
computer.  If someone were to implement a patented method through the use of a properly 
programmed CPU, the two constituents of our hypothetical system are separated.  That is, the 
CPU itself is the physical device that enables the execution of the method.  Also necessary is the 
programming to instruct the CPU to implement the specific method.  Thus, the CPU is the 
physical device constituent and the software is the information constituent of the entire system.   
A second class of ICs available are application specific integrated circuits (ASIC).  ASIC 
devices are capable of performing only a single, specific function.  An example would be a 
device controlling a child's toy that plays the same sound each time the toy is squeezed.  If 
someone were to use an ASIC device to practice a patented method, the two constituents of our 
hypothetical system would be one and the same.  The ASIC chip itself would be the physical 
device that enables the execution of the method.  Additionally, the information necessary to 
instruct the ASIC device to implement the method would be hard-wired into the device itself. 
In reality, this distinction between components and entire systems is not black and white.  
There are few systems that require absolutely no extrinsic information.  For example, even an 
ASIC chip has specific inputs without which it will not operate, such as signals as basic as power 
or a trigger.  As such, a continuum exists between components and entire systems based on the 
level of extrinsic information needed, and a line must be draw between them.  A logical place to 
make this division would be tied to the underlying behavior that § 271(f) seeks to address.  
Section 271(f) seeks to limit exportation of devices that infringe a patent, rather than limit 
  
exportation of general raw materials.161  As such, one may look to whether a possible component 
has significant non-infringing uses.  A product that has significant non-infringing uses requires 
extrinsic information before the invention is practiced.  A product that has no significant non-
infringing uses may be used to practice the patented invention without the use of significant 
extrinsic information.  Accordingly, the presence of significant non-infringing uses may be used 
to determine whether something is a component or an entire system, and, in turn, whether it is a 
“component.” 
2. Alternative Exportation Arrangements 
In addition to exportation arrangements where the entire system is divided into two 
pieces, the device portion of the system may also be broken into multiple pieces.  However, such 
variation in the method of exportation does not affect the component status.  Consider the  
variation relevant in Deepsouth.162  In Deepsouth, a shrimp-deveining machine was sold in 
several large pieces that could be assembled in a manner that would infringe upon a product 
patent covering the machine if executed within the United States,.163  In a situation where the 
patent was not in the form of a patented machine, but rather of a patented process of deveining 
shrimp, whether the exported pieces of the machine would be components of the machine is less 
clear.  The patent holder may argue that because the machine was exported in pieces, no 
individual piece constituted the entire system.  As such, each would be a component of the 
patented method.  Further, because the pieces had no substantial non-infringing uses, their 
exportation would infringe § 271(f)(2). 
This argument not only confuses the underlying differences between product and process 
inventions but also wholly fails to appreciate the underlying purpose of § 271(f).  The addition of 
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§ 271(f) to the Patent Act shows that Congress intended for the exportation of a disassembled 
machine to be the functional equivalent of the exportation of the assembled machine, where it 
would be reassembled abroad,.  Accordingly, it is proper to consider the totality of what was 
exported in determining its component status.  The exportation of a physical device broken into 
pieces is the functional equivalent of exporting the assembled machine when determining 
component status.  Therefore, to determine whether the exported disassembled machine 
comprises the entire system, the totality of what was exported should be examined.  Where, as 
here, the totality of what was exported would comprise the entire system needed to execute the 
patented method, the exported products would not be a component of the patented method. 
3. Distinction Propriety 
The propriety of the constituent-total system distinction is not only evidenced, but is 
demanded by C.A.F.C. precedent.  The machine at issue in Standard Havens was a plant to 
produce asphalt by executing a patented method.164  As such, this plant, like an ASIC device, 
included both the physical device and information elements of the system.  As there were no 
significant non-infringing uses for this machine, the level of external information required to 
implement the patented method was insignificant.  This insignificant external information likely 
included basic operational inputs only.  Therefore, the plant was not a "component" of the 
patented method and thus did not infringe under § 271(f).165 
Eolas, on the other hand, provides an example of an element that is a "component” of a 
patented method.166  At issue in Eolas was "a method for running an application program in a 
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computer network environment.”167  The alleged "component" was a golden-master disc 
containing computer code that would instruct a computer to execute the patented method.168  
Here, the two principle constituents of the system needed to execute the method were separate 
elements.  The first element, the physical device to enable the execution of the method, is the 
computer.  The second element, information to instruct the device to execute the specific 
method, is the software code contained on the golden-master.169  As both elements were needed 
to execute the invention – neither alone constituted the entire system.  For example, the golden-
master disc could not alone execute the invention without a physical device.  Similarly, the 
computer could not execute the patented method without the external input of the software.  As 
there were significant non-infringing uses for the computer, the required information was 
significant.  Thus, the computer was also a "component" of the patented method.170  The 
consistency of the outcomes of an application of this definition to C.A.F.C. cases demonstrates 
that a "component" of a patented method is not only method steps or acts, but is also any 
component used in the execution of the patented method.171 
This illustrates a variance in the scope of components of patented processes and products.  
A method inherently consists of only method steps or acts, while the definition of its components 
is broader.  As such, a physical component of a patented method would not necessarily be 
incorporated in the final product, as is required of components of patented products.  The final 
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product of a patented method is less obvious than that of a patented product, where the final 
product is obviously the patented product itself.  The final product of a patent method may be the 
complete method itself – that is, the executed combination of all method steps.  Alternately, the 
final product of a patent method may be something else, as in the case of a method of 
manufacture where the final product of a patent method would be the physical device produced 
by the method.  In either case, a physical component of a patent method is not necessarily 
incorporated into the final product.   
Consider for example the component catalyst of the patented method in Union Carbide.  
If the complete method is considered the final product, a catalyst (not being a method step) is not 
incorporated.  Further, if the final product is considered to be the physical product produced by 
the method, a catalyst (by definition not consumed in the process) is not incorporated in the final 
product.172  Therefore, this broad definition of component of a patented method illustrates a 
variance in the breadth of the definition of “component” based upon the type of invention.  
 
B. Interpretation of Supply 
In addition to determining whether an element is indeed a "component," one must also 
determine whether it has been "supplied.”  Throughout C.A.F.C. case law, the construction of 
"supply" has been intertwined with, and sometimes seemingly collapsed into, the construction of 
"component."  However, a thorough analysis of § 271(f) and its respective C.A.F.C. case law 
shows that the requirements must be delicately parsed and considered individually.  Such an 
analysis reveals that in determining whether there has been a supply, the C.A.F.C. looks to two 
aspects of supply: manner of supply and what has been supplied.  The manner of supply was a 
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distinction often argued by advocates, but ultimately not adopted by the C.A.F.C.  The second 
distinction, what was supplied, must be delicately separated from the component requirement.  
Authority has found that some elements, though technically possess "components," are 
inherently incapable of being “supplied.” 
1. Manner of Supply 
 
a. No Physicality Requirement 
The relevance of the manner of supply was first examined in Pellegrini.  There, the 
C.A.F.C. began to draw a distinction as to whether something had been physically supplied.173  
As explained above,174 the applicability of this distinction was quickly shaken off from either 
§ 271(f) requirement in a clever two-step process.  First, Eolas “clarified” that this physicality 
requirement attached only to the term "supply" rather than “component,”175 thus allowing non-
tangible elements to be components.  Second, AT&T re-interpreted Pellegrini's physicality 
requirement to not attach to "supply," stating that Pellegrini's holding was dependent on the 
scope of the term "components.”176  AT&T gave no discussion of, and made no attempt to 
distinguish, the opposite interpretation of Eolas –  thus ignoring the principle of stare decisis and 
further obfuscating an already confusing area of law.  In this way, each case effectively pointed 
the finger at the other requirement, ultimately leaving little of the Pellegrini physicality 
requirement.  Accordingly, if the component at issue is software, whether it is “sent abroad via 
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electronic transmission or shipped abroad on a ‘golden master’ disk is a distinction without a 
difference for the purposes of § 271(f) liability.”177   
Components such as software may be supplied through either physical delivery on a disc 
or through an intangible electronic transmission.  As the AT&T court explained, the key 
distinction is whether something has been supplied abroad or only domestically.178  As actual 
exportation is a separate requirement of § 271(f), the court strongly suggested that the physicality 
of the mode of supply indicated in Pellegrini is completely irrelevant.179 
b. Directness of Supply 
As soon as the AT&T court rejected the physicality requirements of mode of supply, 
another distinction regarding mode of supply was announced.  In RIM, the court held that 
physical devices, sold domestically and brought by customers abroad, that were used to practice 
a patented invention did not infringe § 271(f).180  As explained above, a reading of RIM on its 
face does not reveal whether RIM was construing the term "component" or "supply.”  Later, 
Union Carbide made clear that RIM was not based upon component status, and was instead 
based upon a lack of supply.181  The holding of RIM, as dictated later by Union Carbide, shows 
that a component sold domestically for domestic use is not supplied abroad under § 271(f), even 
if it is later carried abroad by purchasers of the component.182  Therefore, although the manner of 
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supply may not depend on its physicality, it does depend on the directness of the connection 
between the component leaving the United States and the supplier's actions.183   
c. Context of Supply 
In addition to the directness of supply, the context of the invention is also a relevant 
factor when examining the manner of supply.  The activities that may be considered part of the 
supply depend upon the nature of the specific component being supplied.  These activities are 
those that are typically involved in the supply of other similar components.184  For example, in 
AT&T the supply of software was at issue.185  The C.A.F.C. began by examining the manner in 
which software was typically supplied to determine which activities were parts of the supply.186  
Because the supplying of software commonly involves generating a copy, “the act of copying is 
subsumed in the act of ‘supplying,’ such that sending a single copy abroad with the intent that it 
be replicated invokes § 271(f) liability for those foreign-made copies.”187  Thus, in the case of 
software, acts committed by the recipient of supplied components may be included as part of the 
initial "supply" under § 271(f).  Accordingly, to determine the extent and presence of supply, one 
must also consider the context of the component being supplied. 
2. What Was Supplied 
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While the manner in which components are supplied broadens the activities that are 
included as part of "supply," limitations as to what is capable of being supplied must also be 
considered.  As discussed above,188 a component of process invention may be either a method 
step or a component used in the patented method.  Though the C.A.F.C. has clearly held that 
both types of elements are components, the possibility of their being supplied differs.  A method 
step is an abstract process of conducting an activity, and is thus not typically “supplied”.  As the 
RIM court expressly announced, “it is difficult to conceive of how one might supply or cause to 
be supplied all or a substantial portion of the steps of a patented method.”189  Although a method 
step may be a component of an invention, the typical context of such components suggest that it 
may not be possible to supply method steps under § 271(f).   
To fully understand the inappropriateness of the application of § 271(f) to the supply of a 
method step, one need only consider the basic situation in which it arises.  For example, consider 
a situation where a patented method of manufacturing a coffee mug is executed by conducting 
some of the method steps domestically and other steps extraterritorially.  If this transnational 
execution is conducted where no physical components are exported in a manner that infringes 
§ 271(f), all that remains is an argument that because individual method steps are conducted 
abroad there has been a supply of those method steps.190  In this case, the method steps are not 
actually “supplied” from within the United States but rather are simply conducted abroad.  The 
execution of a method step does not originate from any specific location or transport to a final 
destination.  These method steps are simply executed in a single location and thus cannot be 
supplied.  Although § 271(f), which requires supply, is an unnatural fit for such a situation, this 
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behavior can be analyzed naturally under other sections.191  Thus, to fully understand whether 
and to what extent a component has been supplied, one must look to the method of supply as 
well as what is allegedly being supplied.  
C. Resulting Rules 
 
Several basic rules emerge from the Federal Circuit’s construction of “component” and 
“supply.”  When determining whether something is a component, the rules differ slightly for 
product and process claims.  A component of a product claim can be either tangible or intangible 
with no requirement of physicality.  The component, however, must be incorporated into the 
final product.  Although not addressed by case law, a component must also only be a constituent 
of the final product rather than the entire system.  This simply results from the fact that the 
production and sale of an entire system would quite clearly fall under § 271(a) rather than 
§ 271(f), as well as from the definition of “component.”192   
A component of a patented process invention can similarly be either tangible or 
intangible.   That is, such components need not be method steps or acts, but can also be tangible 
devices used in the execution of a patented method.  Due to the nature of method claims, 
however, such components need not be integrated into any final device.  The chief limitation of 
such components is that they must be constituent components used in the process, rather than an 
entire system that executes the patented process independently. 
The interpretation of “supply,” on the other hand, does not vary with the type of invention 
at issue.  As such, separate analyses of product and process inventions are not needed.  The two 
chief limitations of supply are the manner of supply and what is allegedly being supplied.  The 
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manner of supply is not limited to supply by physical means, however it must possess a requisite 
directness.  Additionally, to determine which activities are parts of the supply, the context of the 
invention must be considered.  In addition to the manner of supply, to determine whether there 
has been a supply, there are also limitations as to what components are supplyable.  Specifically, 
although they may possess component status, method steps and acts are not capable of being 
supplied. 
IV. RAMIFICATIONS OF THE CURRENT RULE 
 
To better understand which activities are delineated by current § 271(f) doctrine, it is 
instructive to consider three independent invention types and actions taken that may infringe 
each of those inventions.  This section will consider (1) a patented product, (2) a patented 
method of making an unpatented product and (3) a patented method of using an unpatented 
product.  Each of these inventions has different characteristics and components, and thus 
different activities will infringe each type of patented invention. 




When examining a patented product invention, although not patented as a method, it is 
still prudent to examine whether such an invention may be infringed by the execution of actions 
related to the product.  For example, domestically conducted actions that constitute use of the 
patented product infringe the patented product under § 271(a).  Where domestically conducted 
actions are merely tangential to, or in preparation for, use of the patented product (that is, actions 
that are related to, but are not themselves an actual use), and the actual direct use of the patented 
  
product is conducted abroad, there is no domestic use to infringe under § 271(a).  For example, 
suppose a device is patented that creates copies of a floppy disk using a two-step process.  If a 
user purchases the machine with a limited license that only allows a single use, each additional 
domestic use would constitute an infringement under § 271(a).   
To avoid such infringement the user may situate the machine such that the first step of the 
copying process is conducted domestically while the second step of the process is conducted in 
Canada.  The first use, as partial and incomplete, is not a use of the product under § 271(a).193  
There is also no liability under § 271(f), as the second step of the copying process is not a 
component of the patented machine.  Further, executing a method step abroad is not a “supply” 
of a component of the patented product.  As such, territorially divided actions do not infringe a 
patented product under either § 271(a) or (f). 
2. Products 
 
A more common form of infringing a patented product is through the manufacture or 
production of related products.   This production can be analyzed throughout the production 
process, beginning with raw physical materials, continuing to the partially manufactured product 
and through to the completed product.  It is helpful to analyze the infringing nature of the 
production of various products present in each step of this process independently. 
The analysis of the production of the complete patented product--that is, complete 
production without an intermediate transfer--is quite simple.  When the production process is 
conducted to completion domestically, and the patented product is produced, the patent has been 
infringed under § 271(a).  On the other hand, when the product is produced entirely abroad, there 
is no infringement. 
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When something other than the complete final product is produced, the analysis becomes 
more complicated.  Although there is no infringement under § 271(a), other provisions of § 271 
may be violated based upon what is next done with the product.  Two choices remain: the 
product may be held or it may be transferred.  Holding the product results in no further 
transaction and thus no part of § 271 is violated.  If the product, on the other hand, is transferred, 
it may be done so domestically or abroad.  It is these transfers that implicate many of the other 
provisions of § 271. 
a. Domestic Transfer of Products 
Domestic transfer of an intermediate product may indirectly infringe a patented final 
product.   For example, a transfer to a domestic company (along with some other action) may 
actively induce the transferee to infringe.  This active inducement infringes the patent under § 
271(b).194  If there is no active inducement, domestic sale of the patented product may still 
infringe § 271(c) if it is done with knowledge that the intermediary is especially made or adapted 
for use in a patented product and does not have substantial noninfringing uses.195   
 
b. Foreign Transfer of Products 
Foreign transfer of an intermediate product must be examined separately from that of 
domestic transfer, as the basis for liability differs substantially.  Both §§ 271(b) and (c) require a 
direct infringer, a situation that is not present in an extraterritorial transfer.196  For example, when 
a product is transferred abroad where it is later used to form the patented product, there is no 
direct infringement.  Direct infringement includes activities only so far as they are executed 
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domestically.197  As such, although liability may be found under either §§ 271(b) or (c) for 
similar domestic transfers, no such liability is present for foreign transfers of an intermediate 
product. 
Although there is no violation of §§ 271(a)-(c) for the foreign transfer of these products, 
such activities may infringe § 271(f).  Liability for § 271(f) infringement depends upon the 
nature of the product transferred.  It is therefore helpful to separately consider products that are 
integrated into a final product and those that are not.  As such, a first category may be defined to 
include those products that are constituents of the final product.  This may include basic raw 
materials and larger products that are both intermediary constituents of a final product.  A second 
category may also be established that includes those physical products that do not become 
integrated into a final product.  This category may include products such as catalysts and 
machines used in the manufacture of a final product.  Each category is dealt with in turn. 
i. Integrated Constituents 
1. Raw Materials 
 
Raw materials include any materials that are not especially adapted for use in the 
patented product, and are staple articles or commodities of commerce suitable for substantial 
non-infringing use.  Raw materials may be “components” of a patented product as they are 
incorporated into the final product as constituent ingredients.  Further, extraterritorial transfer of 
raw materials constitutes a “supply,” as they have been directly exported and are not method 
steps.  Although raw materials meet both the “component” and “supply” limitations of § 271(f), 
other textual limitations must be examined.  For example, § 271(f)(1) may be infringed under a 
very narrow set of circumstances for raw materials.  A substantial portion of the components of a 
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patented invention must be supplied along with another step (such as the inclusion of 
instructions) that actively induces others to combine them.  Raw materials are often the basic 
building blocks of any product.  Thus, only through the limited circumstance where a substantial 
amount and variety of raw materials are supplied, will § 271(f)(1) be violated.   
Section 271(f)(2) on the other hand may not be infringed upon through the foreign supply 
of raw materials.  Raw materials, by definition, are not especially made or adapted for use in the 
invention as is required under § 271(f)(2), but rather are staple articles of commerce suitable for 
substantial non-infringing use.  This limitation is independent of whether there is intent that they 
be combined outside of the United States.  As such, the foreign sale of raw material components 
of a patented product may not infringe § 271(f)(2). 
2. Larger Intermediate Products 
Larger intermediate products are the group of products that essentially have no 
substantial uses other than to be combined to form the patented product.  Similar to that of raw 
products, larger intermediate products that are exported may be “components” of a patented 
product that have been “supplied.”   The other requirements of sections §§ 271(f)(1) and (2) are 
met more easily than for that of raw materials.  For example, as outlined above with regard to 
raw materials, § 271(f)(1) may be infringed if the supplied intermediate products constitute a 
substantial portion of a patented product and there is active inducement to combine (such as the 
inclusion of instructions).  The exportation of larger intermediate products also infringes § 
271(f)(2) so long as it is intended that they be put in combination outside of the United States.  
As such, if there is either active inducement or intent to combine, the exportation of larger 
intermediate products infringes a patented product. 
c. Non-Integrated Products 
  
The limitations imposed by the definition of “component of a patented invention” greatly 
simplify the handling of non-integrated intermediate products that are exported.  As discussed 
above, a component of a patented product must be integrated.  Thus, non-integrated products are 
not components and their exportation does not infringe § 271(f).  As such, the exportation of 
catalysts that are used in the manufacture of the patented product, or machines used to produce 
the patented product, does not implicate § 271(f). 
B. Patented Method of Making a Product 
 
Similar to that of patented products themselves, a patented method of making a product 
may be infringed through the execution of actions related to the invention and through the 
creation, use or transfer of products.  Current C.A.F.C. doctrines may be examined to determine 
which behaviors infringe such a patent, and which provision of § 271 is infringed in each 




The simplest form of infringement of a patented method of making a product is the 
execution of the claimed method.  Section 271(a) controls such actions.  Domestically executing 
each step in the patented method is an infringement of the patent under § 271(a).  If, however, 
less than the complete method is executed domestically, there is no infringement of 271(a).  For 
example, domestically executing the first half of the method and extraterritorially executing the 
second half does not infringe § 271(a).   
In a situation with such divided execution, § 271(f) is also left un-infringed.  Although 
the extraterritorially executed method steps may in fact be components of the patented method, 
  
they have not been supplied.  Foreign execution of a method step is not considered 
extraterritorial supply of a component of a patented method.  Section 271(f) is therefore not 
infringed.  This behavior not proscribed anywhere else in § 271.  Thus, territorially divided 
execution of a patented method does not infringe the patent. 
2. Products 
 
In addition to executing the steps of the patented method, producing or exporting 
products related to the patented method may also be an infringement.  Due to the nature of the 
invention, these actions are not a direct infringement.  That is, actions other than the complete 
domestic execution of the patented method do not directly infringe the patent under § 271(a).198  
Though not direct infringement, such actions may infringe upon other parts of § 271.  As 
outlined above, actions involving the production of related products, or the exportation thereof, 
may be analyzed throughout the production process.  In this case however, the categorical 
divisions discussed in relation to patented products are no longer useful.  For example, whether 
the entire product is manufactured, rather than only a part thereof, is no longer the most relevant 
distinction.  In this case, a distinction based upon whether the entire method has been executed is 
more appropriate.  Further, as no products are integrated into the patented method, a division 
based upon integration is no longer needed.  As such, it is more useful to divide behaviors into 
the following three categories: (1) intermediate products created during the execution of patented 
methods, (2) catalysts used to facilitate the execution of patented methods, and (3) machines 
used to facilitate the execution of patented methods. 
a. Intermediary Products Created During the Execution of Patented Methods 
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Intermediary products are the products that result from partial execution of the patented 
method.  For example, if one patents a two-step method for manufacturing a mug that consists of 
(1) creating a handleless mug, followed by (2) attaching a handle to the handleless mug.  The 
initial handleless mug is an intermediate product created during the execution of the patented 
method of mug manufacture.  When such intermediate products are produced, different 
provisions of § 271 are implicated based upon where the activities are executed.  As such, this 
section first discusses domestic activities and then discusses exportation.   
i. Domestic Activities  
In general, domestic activities involving intermediate products do not infringe patented 
methods of manufacture.  For example, the production of an intermediate product, by definition, 
does not require the complete execution of the patented method.  As such, there is no direct 
infringement under § 271(a).  Further, the domestic transfer of such products does not cause 
others to execute the complete method; since the method has already been partially executed, the 
purchasers of the intermediate product need not completely execute the patented method 
themselves.  Thus, the sale of such a product is not an inducement of others to infringe under § 
271(b).  Further, as § 271(c) also requires a direct infringer, domestic transfer does not 
contributorily infringe the patent.199  
ii. Exportation  
Although domestic transfer of intermediate products is not an infringement because a 
direct infringer is not present, their exportation is controlled by § 271(f) – which does not require 
the presence of a direct infringer.  Such products must therefore both be a “component” of the 
invention and be “supplied.”  Though not directly addressed by case law, intermediate products 
created by the execution of the patented method are components of a patented method that may 




be exported.  For example, patented methods of manufacture are often a series of steps that 
cumulatively create the article of manufacture.  Each step acts on the product of the previous 
step.  As such, the product of the previous step is needed to execute each subsequent step.  
Further, as these components are physical, their exportation may constitute a “supply” so long as 
it is sufficiently direct. Each intermediate product is therefore a component (as opposed to the 
complete system) supplied for use in the execution of the patented method, and may thus infringe 
§ 271(f).  Similar to that of components of a patented product, exportation of components of a 
patented method must meet the remaining requirements of §§ 271(f)(1) and (2).  As such, it is 
instructive to consider some of the same categories discussed above. 
1. Raw Materials 
As defined above, raw materials are fungible commodities that have substantial non-
infringing uses.  The initial requirements of § 271(f)(1) are met under a very narrow set of 
circumstances for raw materials.  Just as described above,200 § 271(f)(1) may be infringed only if 
a substantial portion of the components of a patented invention are supplied along with another 
step (such as the inclusion of instructions) that actively induces others to combine the 
components in a manner that would be a direct infringement if done in the United States.  As 
such, nearly all of the raw materials needed to execute the patented method, along with 
instructions that teach the use of the patented method, must be supplied.  Section 271(f)(2), on 
the other hand, is not infringed through the foreign supply of raw materials.  Raw materials, by 
definition, are not especially made or adapted for use in the invention as is required under § 
271(f)(2), but rather are staple articles of commerce suitable for substantial non-infringing use, 
independent of whether it is intended that they be combined outside of the United States.  As 
such, the foreign sale of raw material components of a patented method of making a product 
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does not infringe § 271(f) unless a company is effectively selling a kit to infringe another’s 
patent. 
2. Larger Intermediate Products 
As defined above, larger intermediate products are the group of products that, by 
definition, have no substantial uses other than to be combined to form the patented product.  In 
contrast to that of raw products, the other requirements of §§ 271(f)(1) and (2) are more easily 
met.  For example, as outlined above,201 § 271(f)(1) may be infringed if the larger intermediate 
product constitutes a substantial portion of a patented product and there is active inducement to 
combine (such as the inclusion of instructions).  The exportation of larger intermediate products 
infringes § 271(f)(2) so long as it is intended that they be combined outside of the United States.  
As such, if there is either active inducement or intent to combine, the exportation of larger 
intermediate products infringes a patented method of manufacture. 
 
b. Non-Integrated Products 
In addition to intermediate products, the second major category of products of which 
transfer may infringe a patented method are catalysts used to facilitate the execution of patented 
methods.  Although transfers of such products may not directly infringe a patent, some transfers 
may secondarily infringe.  For example, the transfer of a catalyst may cause others to infringe.  
That is, the purchaser of a catalyst may use it to facilitate the execution of the patented method.  
As such, the domestic transfer of such non-integrated products may infringe under §§ 271(b) and 
(c).  Further, because such catalysts are a component of the patented method,202 their exportation 
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may constitute the improper supply of a component of a patented method under § 271(f).  As 
such, so long as the remaining requirements of substantiality or intent are satisfied, exportation 
of catalysts used to facilitate the execution of patented methods may be an infringement of the 
patented method under §§ 271(f)(1) and (2). 
 
c. Machines Used to Facilitate the Execution of the Patented Method 
The final category of products that may infringe a patented method are machines used 
to facilitate the execution of a patented method.  Similar to that of catalysts, the domestic transfer 
of such machines may cause or encourage others to infringe.  As such, their domestic transfer 
may be active inducement or contributory infringement under §§ 271(b) or (c).  Further, a 
machine, or part thereof, may be a component of the patented method of manufacture.  The 
exportation of such machines thus may be an infringement of § 271(f), depending primarily upon 
whether the exported product is a “component.”   
It may be recalled that a product used to execute a patented method is a component of a 
patented invention so long as it does not comprise the entire system needed.  As previously 
discussed, there are two principle elements of the entire system: the device to enable the 
execution of the method and the information needed to instruct the device to execute the specific 
method.  The supply of either element of the entire system infringes under § 271(f)(1) so long as 
there is some active inducement to combine the components abroad. 
This analytical framework, however, chiefly eliminates the possibility of infringement 
under § 271(f)(2) through the exportation of the device portion of the machine.  The component 
requirements for devices that enable the execution of the method and the other § 271(f)(2) 
requirements are mutually exclusive.  In order to obtain component status, devices that enable 
  
the execution of the method must not solely execute the patented method without need for the 
second element – significant external information to instruct the device.  To determine the level 
of external information that rises to significant, it is necessary to examine whether the device is 
capable of substantial non-infringing uses.  Only devices with substantial non-infringing uses 
may be considered to require significant external information.  As such, only devices with 
substantial non-infringing uses may be components of a patented method.  Section 271(f), 
however, specifically excludes from infringement the exportation of any device that is suitable 
for non-infringing uses.  Therefore, the exportation of devices used to execute a patented 
invention may not infringe under § 271(f)(2). 
This conflict is by no means improper.  In general, it is undesirable to use the patent 
monopoly to limit the production, sale or exportation of an invention unless that invention is 
expressly claimed.  For example, process patents generally should not limit the production of 
devices, so long as the claimed process was not executed in that production.  Thus, doctrinal 
tension should be expected when one attempts to use § 271(f) to limit the exportation of a device 
when only a process is claimed.  As such, it is entirely proper that § 271(f)(2) does not limit the 
exportation of devices used to execute a patented method. 
Unlike a device, the second element of the entire system – information – often has no 
significant non-infringing uses.  As such, the exportation of this element may be infringement 
under § 271(f)(2).  Returning to the method for using the Internet example, exportation of the 
needed computer program would satisfy both the component and remaining § 271(f)(2) 
requirements.  This is, in fact, precisely the situation present in Eolas and AT&T.  Thus, although 
exportation of a device will not infringe under § 271(f)(2), exportation of the information needed 
to instruct the device often will. 
  
C. Patented Method, in General 
 
The analysis applicable to patented methods in general203 is a simplified version of the 
analysis used for dealing with infringement involving patented methods of making a product.  
The principle difference here is that a patented method, in general, does not necessarily produce 
a final, tangible product.  This eliminates two categories of possible components: intermediate 
products created during the execution patented method, and non-integrated products.  As such, 
the only components that must be analyzed under the § 271(f) doctrine are machines used to 
facilitate the execution of the patented method.  One may therefore apply the analysis from 
above – less the two eliminated component categories.  In short, so long as there is not a direct or 
indirect infringement under §§ 271(a)-(c),204 one must simply determine whether a machine used 
to facilitate the execution of the patented method is both a “component” and is “supplied” 
abroad.  As such, infringement under § 271(f) occurs in a similar, though much more limited, set 
of circumstances as that of a patented method of manufacturing a product. 
D. The Current Rule’s Effect on Traditional Patent Doctrine 
 
As can be seen, exportation of unpatented inventions may be proscribed by § 271(f).  
This new reach of patents broadens patent protection beyond that traditionally offered.  One may 
wish to consider whether it was the C.A.F.C. or Congress that is responsible for this broadening.  
Such a conclusion, however, is nothing more than a direct comment on the propriety of the 
C.A.F.C. rulings.  Concluding that the broadening was done by the courts, for example, is 
effectively concluding that the C.A.F.C. construed the statute to be broader than Congress 
intended.  This would thus be a conclusion that the current C.A.F.C. construction is fallacious.  
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Rather than engaging in an exercise of statutory interpretation to determine whether the court’s 
construction is correct, a more instructive analysis is one into the propriety of the broadening 
itself.  That is, whether the broadening of traditional patent law, done by either Congress or the 
C.A.F.C., is congruent to the underlying justification for the patent monopoly. 
The initial loophole that § 271(f) was established to close should first be considered.  
This amendment was enacted in response to the unnatural result of Deepsouth.  It was 
determined by Congress that one should not be allowed to profit from the exportation of a 
patented invention simply by distributing the invention piecemeal rather than as an assembled 
whole.  This problem does not encompass the sale of a patented method.  Methods may not 
themselves be separated into pieces and supplied.  The C.A.F.C. has implicitly acknowledged 
this very fact through their doctrine that excludes method steps from being supplyable.  This 
principle was also expressly endorsed by several members of the C.A.F.C. in the dissent to the 
denial for rehearing of Union Carbide.205  A statute, whether initially written or later constructed, 
to protect a method invention in response to a problem effecting only product inventions is an 
unnecessary broadening of patent protection. 
E. Loop Holes Left By Current Doctrine 
 
In addition to broadening the traditional scope of patent law, in some areas the C.A.F.C.'s 
recent interpretations of § 271(f) also carve out at specific holes.  For example, although steps of 
a patented method are a component of a patented invention, a company may move one of those 
steps abroad and avoid liability under § 271(f) as steps of a patented invention cannot be 
supplied.  That is, infringement of a patented method can still avoided by the foreign execution 
of part of a patented method. 
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Consideration of a simple example is helpful in understanding the limits to this loophole.  
For example, a specific method of producing a decorated coffee mug may be patented.  Assume 
for this example that all prior decorated coffee mugs are produced by first attaching a handle to a 
mug and then decorating the mug.  A new invention may be a less expensive method of 
producing a decorated coffee mug by partially decorating the coffee mug, attaching a handle, 
then completing decoration.  In this case, a competing low-cost mug manufacturer who had 
reduced overhead by not investing in R&D may desire to use this new method to manufacture 
their mugs.  Further, in keeping with their low cost strategy, they may wish to avoid paying 
licensing fees.   
In order to avoid liability, this manufacturer may off-shore the middle step of the process 
to avoid liability.  First, partially decorating mugs in the United States and then exporting the 
mugs to Canada for handle attachment may do this.206  Following the attachment, the mug may 
then be imported back into the United States for completion of decortation.207  In total, only two 
of the three steps were executed in the United States.  In such a situation there is no direct 
liability where less than every step of a method claim is completed in the United States.  Further, 
there is no § 271(f) liability for the extraterritorially executed step of handle attachment, as such 
steps are not supplyable. 
This example involving the physical shipment of intermediate products may not always 
be taken advantage of.  In many methods of manufacture it may be cost prohibitive to ship such 
products.  Further, in many cases the shipment of the intermediate product may meet the 
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additional requirements of § 271(f).  That is, they may constitute a substantial portion of the 
components of a patented invention or not be capable of substantial non-infringing use.  In that 
case, the export of the partially manufactured product would infringe the patented method.   
These limitations are lessened in other arrangements however.  Consider as another 
example a variation on the patented method at issue in Diamond v. Diehr.208  There, a new 
method of molding rubber was patented that included the steps of “installing rubber in a press, 
closing the mold, constantly determining the temperature of the mold, constantly recalculating 
the appropriate cure time through the use of the formula and a digital computer, and 
automatically opening the press at the proper time.”209  A company could avoid infringing this 
patent by simply locating the needed computer abroad, rather than in the domestic factory.  That 
is, the only differences between an infringing machine and a non-infringing machine would be in 
the length of wires that connect the mold to the computer and the computer location. 
In such an example, the computation step would be conducted abroad, and thus there 
would be no liability under § 271(a).  Although the computation steps are components of this 
invention, they cannot be exported.  All that is exported abroad is temperature measurements 
which, as abstract numbers, have many non-infringing uses and likely do not comprise a 
substantial portion of the components of a patented invention, thus avoiding § 271(f) liability;210 
and as above, the recalculated cure time that is imported does not infringe under § 271(g).  This 
example, which involves only the transfer of information, is also much less expensive to 
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implement.  As such, § 271(f) case law leaves this very large hole in the protection of patented 
methods. 
One may view this result not as an undesirable error in the § 271(f) doctrine, but rather as 
a situation that should fall outside of the provisions of domestic patent law.   Section § 271(f) is 
an amendment to U.S. patent law enacted in response to a problem that arose out of the 
exportation of products and as such, the solutions the statute provides need fit only those 
problems in which something can be supplied abroad.  Method steps, being un-supplyable, fall 
outside of the bounds of § 271(f) and into the provision of § 271(a).  Section 271(a), on the other 
hand, is a statute that through its very language proscribes only domestic activities.  Thus, rather 
than the aforementioned loophole being considered a mistake, it is properly considered simply 
the C.A.F.C.’s correct acknowledgement of the limits of § 271(f)’s reach.  This construction, if 
adopted by all nations, leads to requiring jurisdictionally divided execution of patented methods 
to be proscribed only by international treaties. 
CONCLUSION 
 
In general, as has been shown, current C.A.F.C. § 271(f) case law has delineated a 
coherent doctrine.  This current doctrine, however, is by no means ideal or well-settled due 
primarily to the inclusion of method claims into the provisions of a statute that was not originally 
enacted to regulate such inventions.  This over-breadth causes many tensions that require 
complex rules to untangle, such as the detailed doctrine necessary to properly determine 
component status of tangible products in relation to a process invention.  In some cases, these 
rules reinforce the underlying doctrine by correctly excluding certain situations from the creation 
of § 271(f) liability.  This is, however, at the great cost of complexity and awkwardness.   
  
These problems have not only increased the inherent tension in the § 271(f) doctrine, but 
have also unsettled the Federal Circuit itself, resulting in the issuance of contentious dissenting 
opinions acknowledging these shortcomings of the current majority.  As such, although it is 
possible to coherently synthesize current C.A.F.C. § 271(f) case law, the resulting rules leave the 
doctrine in a precarious position that will not stabilize so long as § 271(f) is used to govern 
process inventions. 
